Introduction 1
MAX WEBER'S book 'The Religion of India* (henceforth ROI) has suf undeserved fate. Unlike 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capi PESC) it has not given rise to any discussion of the numerous stimulat forward among the specialists most competent to judge them. Part of must lie in the fact that Indian studies, to their great detriment, a Sanskritists and historians on one side, and social scientists, either sociologists, on the other, with neither side showing much concern problems of the other (this seems to be less true in France than elsewh Sanskritists frequently dismiss Weber's book out of hand, on the gr who had to rely on secondary sources can have anything to contribute to religion. Historians, even when they have passed the scissors-and-paste uncritically the statements of documents, do not appear to have begun around interesting sociological or historical hypotheses. Anthropolo hand, are not in a position, in the nature of their study, to address historical theses which Weber advanced; any speculation on the past wh produced has often been proscribed by their fieldwork methodology. has remained largely unread by those Indianists most competent to sociologists in the west, it is probably the only book on India they eve certainly the case with Weber's translators, Gerth and Martindale, is sh obscurity of the translation, the incredible number of misprints in th Sanskrit and Pali words (for which part of the time they use the German by the fact that they translate vajnopavita simplemindedly from the Ger instead of the normal 'sacred thread'.
Three Fallacies in the Interpretation of the Weber Thesis
Insofar as Weber's work has been taken up at all by social scientists the discussion has centred on the connection between Hinduism and sparked off by post-Independence economic development or the lack however, inasmuch as it deals with Weber, has been almost w an equally one-sided spiritualistic c 183) is too prominently placed for Indianists' discussion. Mandelbaum Gunnar Myrdal as explaining India' Hinduism (Mandelbaum 1970: 638) Fallacy (ii) is more interesting and formulation of it (a confusion of (B and Martindale to ROI: 'the central concern of this and other of Weber's studies of countries we today describe as "developing" was with the obstacles to industrialization and mödernization. Weber anticipated by several decades a problem that has come to occupy the post-World War II world ' (ibid. : v) . Similarly Surajit Sinha takes the Weber thesis with reference to India to be that Hinduism is a 'major stumbling block for modernization' (Sinha 1974: 519) . In fact, Weber's principal theme was an answer to problem (B): 'no community dominated by powers of this sort [viz. religious anthropolatry on the part of the laity and a strong, traditionalistic charismatic clergy] could out of its own substance arrive at the "spirit of capitalism'" (ROI: 325). The sentences which follow this in ROI state two corollaries which are indeed relevant to problem (C): that India could not take over capitalism developed elsewhere as easily as the Japanese; and that, though capitalism had already been introduced to India, only the Pax Britannica, according to some , prevented an outbreak of the 'old feudal robber romanticism of the Middle Ages'. But these are only asides, and not the theme of the book as a whole.
Fallacy (iii) has not directly and openly been espoused, so far as I know, but it lurks in the claim that Weber's project with regard to PESC and the studies of the world religions was an application of Mill's method of agreement and difference. Of course the cases in which Protestantism did not produce capitalism are too well known for such a position to be tenable by present day Weberians.2 Consequently, Weberians claim, not that Protestantism invariably produces capitalism, but that it has a potential to do so. However this does not seem to get us very far in the task of explaining why capitalism appeared in one place rather than another, unless it is analysed in turn in a way similar to that attempted below.
Most commonly, fallacy (iii) is committed tacitly along with (ii). It is assumed that Weber asserted the existence of a necessary and sufficient link between Protestantism and rational capitalistic activity, or at least that the former is a necessary condition of the latter, so that even if all Protestants are not capitalists, no Catholic can be one. Put like this it may sound absurd, but much of the debate has been carried on at this sort of level. As H. Luethy remarked, 'it was as though the essential thread had suddenly been discovered which would lead dialectically from the nailing of Luther's ninety-five theses on the Wittenberg church door to the assembly lines of Detroit and the ramifications of Standard Oil' (Wrong ed., 1970: 128) .
In the Indian context Weber's claim that non-European civilizations could not have developed capitalism endogenously because they lacked the ideological resources to produce a capitalist spirit, i.e. an active rational thisworldy asceticism, is misinterpreted as the 'theory' that Chinese, Hindus or whatever make bad capitalists. In other words, Weber's answer to problem (B) above is taken as an answer to problem (C), and the causal connection asserted is presumed to be an invariable one. In this way it is possible to attempt to refute his characterization of the Hindu 'spirit' by citing 'the evidence today before us of politically independent Asian states actively planning their social, economic and scientific and technical development ' (Singer 1961: 150) . This is of course to miss the crucial that Weber was concerned with the first unplanned, endogenous appearance of indus capitalism, and with India's potential or lack of it for the production of a capitalist s which was its necessary condition. Capitalist economic organization according to Web not at all the same thing; the latter may exist, carried on in a tradionalistic spiri pre-industrial societies without having any potential to transform its environment.
In an approach similar to Singer's, Tambiah seems to assume that because Buddhism Hinduism can be adapted to modernization, because they can, ex post , provide analogu the Protestant Ethic, Weber's theory is disproved (Tambiah 1973: 13-16) . But since W is addressing problem (B), in order to refute him in this way, one must show that Buddh and Hinduism had this potential before the impact of modernization. It is quite wron attribute to him the thesis that there is an innate hostility between Hinduism or eastern religions and capitalism. In his book on China he explicitly repudiates such a cla .It is obviously not a question of deeming the Chinese 'naturally ungifteď for the deman capitalism. But compared to the Occident, the varied conditions which externally favored the o of capitalism in China did not suffice to create it. Likewise capitalism did not originate in occiden or oriental Antiquity, or in India, or where Islamism held sway. Yet in each of these areas diff and favorable circumstances seemed to facilitate its rise (Weber 1951 : 248) .
What then was Weber's position? It was that the spirit of capitalism was a neces precondition of the first appearance, or origination of capitalism. It was not of cour sufficient condition, as the case of Jainism shows. Nor was it a necessary conditio capitalism as such: once capitalism stands on 'mechanical foundations' it is capitalism w tends to produce a capitalist spirit, or aspects of it, rather than the other way round importance of Protestantism lay in the fact that it produced and legitimated a capit spirit; but there was no necessary and/or sufficient link between Protestantism and capitalist spirit (see PESC: 91 & 85) . It is therefore quite beside the point to cite ag Weber examples of non-Protestant capitalists or of Protestant non-capital Protestantism was one element of a situation which, taken as a whole, was sufficie produce a capitalist spirit, which in turn was, as stated, necessary for the first unpla appearance of industrial society.
Weber's studies of India, China and Islam were designed to show that, although o elements necessary for the production of capitalism existed (such as those discussed 'General Economic History'), a capitalist spirit did not and indeed could not. With
Protestant ethic or some equivalent no traditional (i.e. agrarian) civilization could dev capitalism 'from within itself'. Only religious sanctions, Weber assumed, could induce permanently to defer satisfaction in the way required to produce the capitalist spiri this-worldly aim could produce an active rational this-worldly asceticism: only a parti type of religion could do so. In fact the studies revealed, in at least one case, an analo ethic (Jainism) and the burden of explanation shifted, as we shall see, to the absence of o conditions.
Probable reasons for the prevalance of the fallacies
The three fallacies listed above are by no means always made, but even when they rejected, the way in which they go together does not seem to have been grasped. Giddens Thus 'the management, for instance, of a bank, a wholesale export business, a large r establishment, or of a large putting-out enterprise dealing with goods produced in homes certainly only possible in the form of capitalistic enterprise. Nevertheless, they may a carried on in a traditionalistic spirit ' (PESC: 65) . This is indeed the way they alway nearly always, have been carried on, and Weber made it clear that this type of econo behaviour has no power to transform society. Protestantism, by contrast, prod individuals imbued with the capitalist spirit; and as an unforseen consequence produc new type of society based on its own attitude to work. In reply to the initial publicati PESC Sombart had cited the case of Alberti, a Renaissance man, in both senses, who wr treatise on household management which displayed a thoroughgoing moneyminded Weber replied:
The essential point of the difference [between Alberti and Franklin] is . . . that an ethic base religion places certain psychological sanctions (not of an economic kind) on the maintenance o attitude prescribed by it, sanctions which, so long as the religious belief remains alive, are hi effective, and which mere wordly wisdom like that of Alberti does not have at its disposal. On so far as these sanctions work, and, above all, in the direction in which they work, which is o very different from the doctrine of the theologians, does such an ethic gain an independent influ on the conduct of life and thus on the economic order. This is, to speak frankly, the point of whole essay, which I had not expected to find so completely overlooked (PESC: 197).
The Challenge to the Weber Thesis
The real question which Weber's approach has to face has been missed by most of literature. It is: why was the development which occurred within pre-industrial socie (see problem (A) above) not sufficient to produce modern capitalism? From an evoluti perspective such as that of Luethy, development within agrarian civilizations ought t sufficient to produce industrial capitalism. The emphasis that Weber placed
Protestantism 'creating' capitalism is therefore misplaced: 'In the period of the Reform all the bases of the modern world -capital, wealth, the highest technological and art level of development, global power, world trade -all these were almost exclusively pre in countries that were and remained Catholic. . . . One century later all this was petrifica and decay'. The real problem, which according to Luethy is missed by Weber and Weberians, is to explain 'the sudden breaking of an ascendant curve of development' in Catholic countries, not its continuance in the Protestant ones (Wrong ed. 1970: 133 
The Chinese case
The Chinese case is particularly impor of the conditions for the development o there was no capitalist spirit. 'Rational entrepreneurial capitalism, which in the found its specific locus in industry, has been handicapped not only by the lack of a guaranteed law, a rational administration and judiciary, and by the ramifications of of prebends, but also, basically, by the lack of a particular mentali ty' (Weber 1 This crucial lack, which Weber calls his 'central theme', is tackled in part 2 of 'Th of China', which attempts to show why a capitalist spirit did not, and indeed co given its cultural resources, develop in China, Clearly Weber's explanation is a negative one: the absence of a capitalist spirit m China could not develop modern capitalism, even though in the early Medieval was the most advanced society in the world, in terms of agricultural, economic, c and technological development. Weber does not provide a detailed answer to the why this development should not be self-sustaining, i.e. sufficient to produc capitalism, though he gives a couple of hints in 'Economy and Society':
It would be a mistake to assume that the development of capitalistic enterprises m proportionally to the growth of want satisfaction in the monetary economy, and an ev mistake to believe that this development must take the form it has assumed in the Western fact, the contrary is true. The extension of money economy might well go hand in hand increasing monopolization of the larger sources of profit by the oikos economy of the p is also possible that with the extension of a money economy could go a process of 'feuda fiscal advantages resulting in a traditionalistic stabilization of the economic system. This in China . . . (Weber 1968: 113) .
As always in the area of 'techniques' -we find that the advance proceeded most slowly older structural forms were in their own way technically highly developed and fu particularly well adapted to the requirements at hand (ibid. : 987).
A detailed theory of what happens under these conditions has been elaborated Elvin for the Chinese case, which he calls the high-level equilibrium trap. I shall summary:
In China, demand and the supply of materials were increasingly constrained by a special combination of circumstances that gradually spread across the country until, by about 1820, they held all of the eighteen provinces within the Wall in their grip. These circumstances were: (1) The rapidly falling quality, and hence rapidly falling returns to labour and other inputs, of the small remaining quantity of new land not yet opened to cultivation and capable of being opened under the existing technology; (2) The continuing increase of the population, reducing the surplus per head available above subsistence for the creation of concentrated mass markets for new goods, and also (though less significantly) for investment; (3) The impossibility of improving productivity per hectare in agriculture under a pre-modern technology that was the most refined in the world in terms of manuring, rotations, etc., without the modern inputs such as chemical fertilizers and petrol or diesel pumps that presuppose a scientific and industrial revolution for their production; and (4) The great size of China (close to twice the population of Europe), and its relatively good commercial integration, which made it impossible for pre-modern foreign trade to substitute for internal inadequacies, either by providing the stimulus of a large volume of new demand or the support of large quantities of cheap raw materials. The trap could only be broken by the introduction of new technology exogenous to the Chinese world (Elvin, forthcoming, English version) . Rational strategy [therefore! for peasant and merchant alike tended in the direction not so much of laboursaving machinery as of economizing on resources and fixed capital. . . . When temporary shortages arose, mercantile versatility, based on cheap transport, was a faster and surer remedy than the contrivance of machines (Elvin 1973: 314 This was so even though Jainism was based on a quite different theology, in which insofar as he is admitted to exist, is irrelevant to the concerns of man. The Jaina comm was led by monks, and the laity, as was not the case in Buddhism, were integrated in ascetic values, and to a certain extent the practices, of their monasticism. However the J remained a minority within Hindu society to which they increasingly accommo themselves. They became in effect a caste or several castes, and could not escape the g consequences of caste society. 4 That they remained confined to commercial capitalism failed to create an industrial organization was again due to their ritualistically deter exclusion from industry and as with the Jews their ritualistic isolation in general. This have been added to by the now familiar barriers which their Hindu surroundings w traditionalism put in their way besides the patrimonial character of kingship' (ibid.).
Caste and Status Group
Weber explains the different types of religion to be found in India principally reference to two strata: 'the social world was divided into the strata of the wise and edu and the uncultivated plebeian masses' (ROI : 343). As we approach the present he also the category of the 'aliterate middle classes'. He does not discuss what he thinks relation between these strata and caste; the very use of the word 'stratum' is perhaps a s vagueness. Caste on the other hand Weber takes to be a 'closed status group':
What is a 'status group'? 'Classes' are groups of people who, from the standpoint of sp interests, have the same economic position. . . . 'Status', however, is a quality of social honor of it, and is in the main conditioned as well as expressed through a specific style of life. . . . obligations and barriers that membership in a status group entails also exist in a caste, in which are intensified to the utmost degree (ROI: 39-40).
Louis Dumont takes Weber to task for this definition of caste: to understand cast form of something found in the West (a) is ethnocentric and (b) necessarily mak religious aspect of caste secondary (Dumont 1972 : 62-3) . Weber is aware of the impor of the religious aspect and that it is this which makes a crucial difference between among Hindus and caste among Muslims or Buddhists, but he does not see caste as rad different from the kind of status groups found in other societies, which if Dumont is ri is necessary to do.
Without going further into theories of caste,3 it is clear that Weber's approach see have blinded him to an important fact , viz. that although all Brahmans to be conside such had, in the traditional situation, to maintain a certain way of life (like the member status group), it was by no means the case that all Brahmans could be said to belong class of cultured intellectuals. The same applies pari passu to Ksatriyas. 'In India' W says, 'the Brahmans represent a status group of lierati partly comprising princely chapl partly counsellors, theological teachers, and jurists, priests and pastors', thoug immediately concedes: 'in both cases [i.e. Indian and China] only a portion of the group occupied the characteristic positions . In fact, although many twice-born would comply with Brahmanical customs, and even learn Sanskrit, and Here in essence is the theory later elaborated by Louis Dumont in his famous essay world renunciation in Indian religion (Dumont 1950) .
Brahmanical Religion
Weber's remarks on Brahmanical religion were extremely perceptive. Even if today would have to be supplemented, his conclusions as to the social implications of the orthodox part of Hinduism remain valid:
The fact that the Brahmanical priestly stratum was a distinguished and cultivated nobility, la class of genteel literati determined its religiosity . . . orgiastic and emotional elements of an magic rites . . . for long periods were either completely suppressed or were permitted on unofficial folk magic (ROI: 137).
As we have observed, this may be taken as correct if read as referring to Brahman religion , above all what is known as Smarta Brahmanism; Brahmans themselves b means always kept to genteel religiosity. The similarities and differences with Confu intellectuals are extremely enlightening:
In both we find a status group of status literati whose magical charisma rests on 'knowledge'. knowledge was magical and ritualistic in character, deposited in a holy literature, written in a language remote from that of everday speech. In both appears the same pride in educatio unshakable trust in this special knowledge as the cardinal virtue determining all good. Ignoran this knowledge was the cardinal vice and the source of all evil. They developed a similar 'ration -concerned with the rejection of all irrational forms of holy seeking (ROI: 139).
However whereas the Confucian literati were paradigmatically office-holders guardians of a universalistic ethic, the Brahmans were 'by background and nature pr (ROI: 148) and the guardians of a relativiste ethic.
The view that Brahmans are paradigmatically priests has been contested recentl Heesterman (Heesterman 1964 (Heesterman & 1971 . Certainly the evidence is unambig that the Brahman who can avoid priestly activity and devote himself to knowledg teaching, has higher status than the priest (see e.g., Parry 1980) . Nevertheless Brahm remained guardians of a relativistic caste ethic, whatever their occupation, so long as gave allegiance to the Vedas (i.e. did not become Buddhists or Jains). Weber quite rig noted that though 'contemplative mysticism as a type of gnosis remains the crown o classical Brahmanical style of life, the goal of every well-educated Brahman . . . the nu of those who actually pursue it was as small in the medieval past as today' (ROI: 148).
Weber is equally good when he deduces the aim of Brahmanical religion from the s position of its adherents:
The status pride of cultured men resisted undignified demands of ecstatic therapeutic practice the exhibition of neuropathic states . . . Once again, this is an excellent characterization of Brahmanism, but misses the way in which even its adherents interpreted it in terms of magical powers. Crucial to the way in which anti-magical or anti-deistic doctrines would resurface in magical or deistic interpretations was the fact that texts were learned by heart in Sanskrit, not learned by reading, so that even many of those who could recite them needed explanations.4 Also, Weber perhaps overestimates the importance of communion with a 'depersonalized' godhead: the other two forms of mysticism he mentions became increasingly important with the rise of the monotheistic sects.
Weber saw very clearly that the development of this mysticism posed certain problems for Brahmanical thought: how to reconcile the ideal of renunciation with caste duty?
For one thing, from such mysticism no ethic for life within the world could be deduced. The Thus although this 'denial of the world' was extremely 'radical', it 'did not reject suffering or sin or the imperfection of the world, rather it rejected transitory nature' (ROI: 167). So, as Dumont has also been at pains to stress, Brahmanical soteriology is accommodated to Brahmanical social teaching: the ideal of the renouncer is absorbed into Hinduism in such a way as to pose no threat to it, and in such a way that it excluded the possibility of a rational t bis-worldly asceticism. This was because on the one hand, the ideal was relativized and, on the other, because it was, in its dominant strains, conceptualized as opposed to all activity.
Buddhism
As with Brahmanism, Weber is not a good guide to the practice of Buddhists.
Nevertheless he has some very perceptive remarks to make about the doctrine which are surely correct in their assessment of its effect on the action of its adherents. Weber's well-known summary is particularly misleading:
Ancient Buddhism ... is a specifically unpolitical and anti-political status religion, more precisely, a religious 'technology' of wandering and of intellectually-schooled mendicant monks. ... Its salvation is a solely personal act of the single individual. There is no recourse to a deity or saviour.
From Buddha himself we know no prayer. There is no religious grace. There is, moreover, no predestination either (ROI: 206).
This picture is based on the doctrinal texts of the Pali canon, and if it was ever true of Buddhism it can only have been so for a short period while the Buddha was alive. A similar picture of 'true Buddhism' was arrived at by nineteenth century commentators in Ceylon and elsewhere who then went on to condemn what they saw of Ceylonese or other Buddhism as corrupt, degenerate, animistic and so on. By paying no attention to the Vinaya (monastic discipline) texts, Weber underestimated the all-important role of the Samgha (monastic community) in the life of the monk. He also underestimated the degree to w early Buddhism had already accommodated itself to lay religious interests and therefo included elements of prayer, deification of the Buddha and so on.5
The urban origin of Buddhism, its original appeal to the middle classes, its universali and sociological egalitarianism, its rejection of magical means to salvation, and its ethi stress on carefulness (Gombrich 1974 ) might make one think that Buddhism was an Ind Protestantism. Weber's conclusions on this count are quite valid:
All rational action ('goal directed action') ... is expressly rejected. Thus, there is lacking an elem which in occidental monkhood increasingly developed and signified so much, namely, the str toward rational method in life conduct in all spheres, except that of the pure intellec systemization of concentrated meditation and pure contemplation. This, on its side, has b increasingly developed to that level of sophistication, also otherwise characteristic of things In (ROI: 222).
Not only was Buddhism not rationalistic in Weber's sense, it was also not ascetic, as indeed the Jains charged:
In principle Buddhistic salvation is anti-ascetic if one conceptualizes, as we wish to do here, asceticism as a rational method of living. Certainly Buddhism prescribes a definite way. . . . However, this way is neither through rationalistic insight into the principles on which it metaphysically rests, in themselves, indeed, timelessly simple, nor a gradual training for ever higher moral perfection. The liberation is ... a sudden 'leap' into the psychic state of illumination, a leap which can only be prepared for through methodical contemplation. The nature of this leap is such that inner experience is set in harmony by theoretical insight, giving the holy seeker, thereby, the Buddhistic perseverantiae gratiae and certitudo salutis; ... As all traditions indicate, this was the Buddha's own self-conscious state of grace (ROI: 220). [In short] just as every rational asceticism does not constitute flight from the world so not every flight from the world represents rational asceticism -as convincingly shown by this example (ROI: 219).
Buddhism was therefore a 'genteel soteriology': Such a genteel soteriology was precisely the basis of all its differences with Christianity. Opposition to genteel soteriology was fundamentally important to the latter (ROI: 371).
For the layman Buddhism offered the Five Precepts 'as an insufficiency ethic of the weak who will not seek complete salvation (ROI: 215). This would seem to mean, not that Weber thinks these are 'paltry stuff as Gombrich interprets him (Gombrich 1971: 245) , but that the ethic is necessarily inferior to the path of becoming a monk. Thus although the later Buddhist suttas . . . deal more thoroughly with lay problems . . . they seek to treat lay morality as a preliminary step to the higher spiritual ethic. . . . This 'higher' morality does not leadthis is the decisive point -to increasingly rational asceticism (extra-or inner-worldly) or to a positive life method. Every satisfaction of work ... is and remains heretical. Rather the opposite holds; active virtue in conduct recedes more and more into the background as against . . . the ethic of nonaction ... in the interest of pure contemplation (ROI: 217).
This inability to produce a 'positive life method' was legitimized by the Buddhist theological principle of 'skill in means', i.e. 'the Buddhist belief in meeting the audience on their own level' (Gombrich 1971 : 247) . Thus on the one hand Buddhist monasticism could not produce rational asceticism out of its conceptual inheritance, but nor could Buddhist lay ethics on the other, because they were tied in, as an inferior partner, to those same values. Asia's partly purely mystical, partly purely inner-worldly aesthetic [i.e. in China] go self-discipline couid take no other form than an emptying of experience of the real for experience. As a consequence of the fact that this lay remote from the interests and pra behaviour of the 'masses' they were left in undisturbed magical bondage (ROI: 342).
It was this 'emptying' nature of the road to salvation which Weber thinks is the cr 'spiritual' factor, to be placed alongside caste and the power of the guru, in prolongin 'enchantment' of the Hindu, i.e. the prelevance of magic as opposed to rationality. It that holy means were always, in one way or another, irrational:
Either they were of an orgiastic character and linked quite immediately in anti-rational man the course of each alien life methodology, or they were indeed rational in method but irratio goal (ROI: 326).
Conclusion
Weber's sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism is a marvel of condensation and, in spite of a superficial appearance to the contrary due to the mass of details, it displays an impressively unitary theme. In order to try and bring out that theme, I have presented and commented on only the most general and prominent points of ROI. To discuss and assess it in all its detail would require another book at least. To ignore Weber's book on India because many of the details are wrong is to ignore also three virtues it conspicuously displays, and which the study of Indian religion and society could well benefit from: (i) comparative range, from China, to Europe, to Ancient Greece, which no single scholar will probably ever again possess; (ii) a genuine historical depth to his study which is only approached even by the best sociologists; (iii) an impressive theoretical apparatus: (a) he treats society as a whole whose parts are interdependent, unlike even so distinguished a Sanskritist as A. L. Basham, whose otherwise excellent ^Wonder That Was India' has one chapter on politics, one on everyday life, one on religion and so on, with little indication of the extent to which they are interrelated; (b) Weber tries to understand and explain the functioning and development of Hinduism and Buddhism in terms of a few basic categories, which are the same as those used to explain other societies. In this, as in much else, the foremost disciple of Weber, in the study of India, is clearly Louis Dumont. 
